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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
EDGAR TIEDEMANN, : Case No. 20080471-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
Defendant/Appellant Edgar Tiedemann has raised two issues on appeal. The first 
concerns a prospective juror, who should have been stricken from the panel for cause. 
Juror No. 19, Ms. English, had worked with the Salt Lake County Sheriffs Office before 
retirement. Her duties included transporting and securing in-custody defendants for 
court. Ms. English was intimately familiar with security measures aimed at criminal 
defendants in courtroom proceedings. 
Courts have cautioned against making jurors aware of a defendant's in-custody 
status since such information undermines the presumption of innocence and creates an 
unacceptable risk that jurors will base their decisions on impermissible considerations. 
(See, e.g.. Brief of Appellant, 11-13). Given Ms. English's personal information, if she 
had been seated as a juror, her familiarity with courtroom security aimed at Tiedemann 
would undermine the presumption of innocence and present an unacceptable risk that 
impermissible factors would play a role in deliberations. (See id., Arg. LB.) Under the 
circumstances, the trial court should have stricken her for cause. (Id.) It failed to do so. 
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Consequently, Tiedemann was required to exercise a peremptory challenge to cure 
trial court error; and that left him with fewer peremptory challenges than the prosecutor. 
The uneven allocation of peremptory challenges was unfair and prejudicial. (See id., 
Arg. LC.) 
The State disagrees. It focuses primarily on the prejudice analysis (Br. of Ap-
pellee, Arg. I.), and it asserts Tiedemann invited error. (Id., 21). Yet the invited-error 
doctrine is inapplicable since Tiedemann objected to Ms. English as a juror. This Court 
may address the issue on the merits, as further explained below. (See infra, Arg. I.) 
The second issue on appeal concerns a pre-Miranda interrogation where 
Tiedemann admitted to shooting Suzie, Chuck, and Scotty "because they had burned him 
on a drug buy of $6,000" (R. 969:148); he admitted to "sniffing glue" (id,); and he made 
a statement about two handguns in his possession. (R. 969:137-38). Tiedemann 
maintains the pre-Miranda statements were inadmissible. (Br. of Appellant, Arg. II. A.) 
In addition, they were prejudicial: the jury was required to assess the credibility of 
Tiedemann and Deborah Pryor - the only witnesses to the shootings - and the pre-
Miranda statements unfairly tipped the balance against Tiedemann. QcL, Arg. II.B.) 
In response, the State again focuses on prejudice (Br. of Appellee, Arg. II.), and 
has made a cursory sufficiency argument. (hL, 29). Yet the prejudice analysis is not the 
sufficiency test in disguise. Prejudice considers the taint caused by the inadmissible 
evidence. If the taint undermines this Court's confidence in the verdict, that is enough to 
support prejudice. Based on the law and the facts in this case, and as set forth in the Brief 
of Appellant, this Court may reverse the convictions. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE REMOVED PROSPECTIVE 
JUROR ENGLISH FOR CAUSE. 
A. THE STATE'S RESPONSE FOCUSES ON PREJUDICE. BASED ON THE 
RECORD HERE, TIEDEMANN HAS ARGUED PREJUDICE. 
As set forth in the opening brief, Tiedemann asked the trial court to remove Juror 
No. 19, Ms. English, from the panel for cause on the grounds that her employment with 
the sheriffs office and her involvement in and knowledge of transporting and securing 
in-custody defendants in trial proceedings denied Tiedemann his rights under the Due 
Process Clause. (Br. of Appellant, Arg. LA. and LB.) Based on Ms. English's personal 
experiences she would have been familiar with security measures aimed at Tiedemann, 
thereby undermining the presumption of innocence. (Id., Arg. I.B.2.) The trial court 
rejected Tiedemann's for-cause challenge and required him to exercise his peremptory 
strike to remove Ms. English from the panel. (Id., Arg. LB.3.) The trial court's ruling 
was in error. (IcL, Arg. LB.) In addition, Tiedemann was prejudiced. (IdL, Arg. I.C.) 
The State disagrees. It has focused primarily on prejudice. (See Br. of Appellee, 
16-22, 23). First, it claims Tiedemann has disregarded the prejudice analysis in State v. 
Menzies, 889 P.2d 393 (Utah 1994), cert denied, 513 U.S. 1115 (1995). (Br. of Appellee, 
18-19). According to the State, Tiedemann is asking this Court to reject the Menzies rule 
in favor of the "automatic reversal rule." (Id.) Yet Tiedemann has not made that request. 
(See Br. of Appellant, Arg. I.C.) Indeed, Tiedemann's analysis complies with Menzies. 
In Menzies, the court ruled that a defendant must show prejudice where he faced a 
"partial or biased jury," or "the jury was made more likely to convict" as reflected in voir 
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dire. 889 P.2d at 400; see State v. Wach, 2001 UT 35, \ 36, 24 P.3d 948 (stating the 
analysis focuses on the empanelled jury). Tiedemann maintains the jury was made more 
likely to convict since he was not able to use a peremptory strike on Juror Dalling. He 
has relied on the record of voir dire and trial proceedings for that argument. (Br. of 
Appellant, Arg. I.C.) According to those proceedings, Dalling was the victim of crime 
where someone broke into his home, and stole his car. (See R. 970:11-12; Envelope of 
"Jury Questionnaires," Juror/Questionnaire No. 8 at 4). Given those circumstances, 
Dalling likely would sympathize with Deborah Pryor, who claimed to be a victim of 
crime in this case. (Br. of Appellant, Arg. I.C); see also State v. Saunders, 1999 UT 59, 
f 37, 992 P.2d 951 (recognizing that a juror's subjective evaluation may be "strongly 
influenced" by the juror's "own experiences and points of view and the possible biases"). 
If Tiedemann had not been required to remove Ms. English from the panel, he 
could have used a peremptory strike on Dalling. (See Br. of Appellant, Arg. I.C.) How-
ever, since the trial court failed to remove Ms. English, Tiedemann was required to do so, 
and he was thereby deprived of the use of a peremptory strike for his own purposes. That 
deprivation affected his rights injury selection. See_ State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 122 
(Utah 1989) (defining prejudice as error that is "of sufficient magnitude that it affects the 
substantial rights of a party") (citations omitted); Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219 
(1965) (stating the peremptory challenge is "'one of the most important of the rights 
secured to the accused'") (citation omitted), overruled on other grounds by Batson v. 
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986); see also Busby v. State, 894 So.2d 88, 102 (Fla. 2004) 
(stating "[t]he harm suffered by the defendant" is having to accept a juror he "would have 
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peremptorily excused but for the need to remedy the trial court's error"); Farias v. State, 
540 So.2d 201, 203 (Fla. Ct. App. 1989) (stating "[i]t is error for a court to force a party 
to exhaust his peremptory challenges on persons who should be excused for cause since it 
has the effect of abridging the right to exercise peremptory challenges"). Moreover, he 
was denied a substantial right in that he was not allowed the same number of peremptory 
strikes as the prosecutor. (See Jury List, Addendum D to the Br. of Appellant); Carrier v. 
Pro-Tech Restoration, 944 P.2d 346, 354-55 (Utah 1997) (recognizing that Menzies does 
not address the situation where there has been a misallocation of peremptory challenges); 
U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 1 (ensuring due process). That disparity supports prejudice as 
set forth in the opening brief. (See Br. of Appellant, Arg. I.C.) 
Second, the State claims Tiedemann invited the error that he asks this Court to 
address on appeal. (Br. of Appellee, 21 (stating Tiedemann's claim fails under the 
invited error doctrine)). Yet the invited error doctrine is inapplicable here. The doctrine 
applies, for example, if the appellant affirmatively represents in the trial court "'that he or 
she ha[s] no objection'" to a particular issue, and then the appellant challenges the issue 
on appeal. See State v. Halls, 2006 UT App 142, f 13 n.l, 134 P.3d 1160 (citing State v. 
Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, \ 54, 70 P.3d 111). Also, it applies if the appellant introduces 
facts into evidence that he then challenges on appeal. See Salt Lake City v. Williams, 
2005 UT App 493, f 29, 128 P.3d 47; State v. Dominguez. 2003 UT App 158, fflf 32-33, 
72 P.3d 127; see also State v. Perdue. 813 P.2d 1201,1205 (Utah Ct App. 1991) (stating 
a party may not appeal an instruction that the same party requested); State v. Dunn, 850 
P.2d 1201, 1220 (Utah 1993) ("[0]n appeal, a party cannot take advantage of an error 
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committed at trial when that party led the trial court into committing the error"). 
"Here, the State has not demonstrated that defense counsel's conduct led the trial 
court" into error, State v. Montiel 2004 UT App 242, | 14, 95 P.3d 1216, particularly 
since defense counsel made a for-cause challenge against Ms. English on the record. (R. 
970:28-34). This Court should "reject the State's argument that Defendant invited the 
error he now asserts on appeal." Montiel, 2004 UT App 242, f 14. 
To the extent the State's invited-error claim concerns Don Dalling - the juror 
Tiedemann could have removed had he not been forced to exercise a peremptory 
challenge on Ms. English - Tiedemann has addressed that issue in the opening brief. 
(See Br. of Appellant, 24-25). Specifically, Dalling's disclosure that he was a victim of 
crime was sufficient to support removing him from the panel with a peremptory strike. 
(See R. 970:11-12; Envelope of "Jury Questionnaires," Juror/Questionnaire No. 8 at 4); 
Busby, 894 So.2d at 100 (stating a peremptory challenge may be used "when defense 
counsel cannot surmount the standard for a cause challenge"; also stating if the defendant 
is required to show actual bias for a peremptory challenge, that requirement will "render[] 
the separate statutory grant of peremptory challenges totally meaningless"); see also State 
v. Brooks, 868 P.2d 818, 823 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (stating a question of bias arises when 
a prospective juror has been the victim of a similar crime), overruled on other grounds, 
908 P.2d 856, 858-59 (Utah 1995). Under the rules of criminal procedure, where 
Tiedemann intended to remove Dalling with a peremptory strike, he was not required to 
make a record of that intent. See. Utah R. Crim. P. 18(d) (stating that for a peremptory 
strike "no reason need be given"); see also Depew v. Sullivan, 2003 UT App 152, ^  29, 
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71 P.3d 601 (stating one purpose of voir dire is to allow parties to collect information for 
peremptory challenges). But see Wgch, 2001 UT 35, fflf 37-43 (rejecting prejudice where 
the defendant did not object at trial to jurors who were empanelled); (Br. of Appellant, 22 
n.2). The State's claim for invited error may be rejected. 
Third, the State claims Tiedemann could have used other peremptory strikes to 
remove Dalling from the jury. (Br. of Appellee, 22). But the record does not support that 
assertion. Tiedemann used other strikes on Ryan Walker, Deborah Shaw, Robert Kelez, 
and Judith Pfeil. (See Jury List, Addendum D to Br. of Appellant). Walker, Shaw, and 
Pfeil disclosed associations with individuals in law enforcement, and/or were victims of 
crime. (See Envelope of "Jury Questionnaires," Juror/Questionnaire Nos. 7 (car broken 
into; close association with law enforcement), 14 (worked with law enforcement in 
dispatch), 24 (home burglary; associations with law enforcement)). In addition, while 
Kelez did not specify that jury duty would be a hardship (icL, Juror/Questionnaire No. 
23), he was self-employed and would be unavailable in the event the trial continued into 
the next week. (See id.: R. 970:35-36). Defense counsel did not want Kelez to be dis-
tracted by his personal obligations. (See id. (stating the trial could be a major disruption 
and "I don't want that to be an issue")). Although Tiedemann was not required to make a 
record of those peremptory strikes, see Utah R. Crim. P. 18(d), they were legitimate. See 
Busby, 894 So.2d at 100 (stating a peremptory challenge may be used "when defense 
counsel cannot surmount the standard for a cause challenge"); see also State v. Ramos, 
882 P.2d 149, 152 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (stating prospective juror's employment with 
police dispatch "raised a question of potential bias," but may not support removal for 
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cause); Brooks, 868 P.2d at 823 (stating a question of bias arises when prospective juror 
has been a victim of a similar crime). And while Tiedemann legitimately exercised 
strikes on Walker, Shaw, Kelez, and Pfeil, the trial court's error deprived him of the use 
of his remaining peremptory strike because he had to use it on Ms. English. (See Jury 
List, Addendum D to the Br. of Appellant). 
In short, since the trial court failed to remove Ms. English for cause (R. 970:34), 
Tiedemann was forced to use a peremptory strike on her. (See Jury List, Addendum D to 
the Br. of Appellant). In that regard, he was deprived of the use of a strike on Dalling; 
thus, the panel was "more likely to convict" as reflected in voir dire, Menzies, 889 P.2d at 
400, since Dalling - a victim of crime - likely would be sympathetic to Deborah Pryor. 
See Saunders, 1999 UT 59, | 37 (recognizing jurors may be "influenced by [their] own 
experiences"); Busby, 894 So.2d at 102 (stating "[t]he harm suffered by the defendant" is 
having to accept a juror he "would have peremptorily excused but for the need to remedy 
the trial court's error"); (Br. of Appellant, Arg. I.C.) Tiedemann has argued prejudice. 
This Court may decide the issue on the merits. 
B. WITH RESPECT TO THE MERITS, PROSPECTIVE JUROR ENGLISH 
HAD PERSONAL INFORMATION THAT WOULD UNDERMINE THE 
PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE. FOR THAT REASON, THE TRIAL 
COURT SHOULD HAVE REMOVED HER FROM THE VENIRE. 
A defendant's due process rights may be violated when jurors are informed at trial 
of courtroom practices aimed at securing the defendant. (See Br. of Appellant, Arg. 
I.A.2.) In this case, the State seems to claim that Ms. English's involvement in the trial 
would not have had an impact on Tiedemann's due process rights. (See Br. of Appellee, 
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23-24). Yet according to the record, Ms. English was familiar with courtroom security 
measures that - if known to jurors- would violate a defendant's due process rights and 
undermine the presumption of innocence. (See R. 970:28-30, and Envelope of "Jury 
Questionnaires," Juror/Questionnaire No. 19 (stating that English worked with in-custody 
defendants in the jail and as a transportation officer; her duties included guarding defen-
dants in holding cells, transporting them to and from the underground facilities, and 
sitting "in on the court hearings"; also she was familiar with in-court policies and pro-
cedures for transporting and securing defendants); Br. of Appellant, Arg. I.A.2., I.B.2.) 
Given Ms. English's experience and background, her participation on the jury 
would have ensured that the jury was aware of security measures aimed at Tiedemann; 
and that knowledge would have constituted improper information made known to the 
jury. See Chess v. Smith 617 P.2d 341, 344 (Utah 1980) (stating "[t]he prejudicial effect 
that flows from a defendant's appearing before a jury in identifiable prison garb is not 
measurable, and it is so potentially prejudicial as to create a substantial risk of 
fundamental unfairness in a criminal trial"); State v. Mitchell, 824 P.2d 469, 473 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1991) (citing numerous cases supporting a defendant's right not to have the jury 
exposed to security measures aimed at him); Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 567 
(1986) (stating that a defendant is entitled to have "'his guilt or innocence determined 
solely'" on the evidence and "'not on grounds of official suspicion, indictment, continued 
custody, or other circumstances not adduced as proof at trial'") (citation omitted); 
Kennedy v. Cardwell 487 F.2d 101, 104 (6th Cir. 1973) (stating defendant is entitled to 
the "physical indicia of innocence" at trial), cert denied, 416 U.S. 959 (1974). Stated 
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another way, while it may be speculative to claim generally that jurors know of security 
aimed at a defendant at trial, see Holbrook, 475 U.S. at 569 (recognizing "it is possible" 
that security in the courtroom may create an "'impression in the minds of the jury'") 
(citation omitted), the speculation evaporates with Ms. English seated as a juror since she 
was intimately familiar with policies and procedures for security. (See R. 970:28-29, and 
Envelope of "Jury Questionnaires," Juror/Questionnaire No. 19). 
In addition, before a trial court may require the defendant to appear before the jury 
in prison clothes or shackles, the court must assess whether the competing interests - i.e., 
the defendant's due process rights vis-a-vis the need for security - support the procedure. 
See, e.g.. State v. Daniels, 2002 UT 2, j^ 20, 40 P.3d 611. In this case, no competing 
interests supported the trial court's decision to sustain a veniremember, who had personal 
knowledge of security aimed at the defendant at trial. Indeed, because Ms. English 
possessed information that would undermine the presumption of innocence, the most 
expedient course was for the trial court to remove her from the panel. See Saunders, 
1999 UT 59, f 51 (stating trial courts "should err on the side of caution" with a for-cause 
challenge given the "simple expedient of replacing a questionable juror with another 
whose neutrality is not open to question") (citation omitted); State v. Baker, 935 P.2d 
503, 510 (Utah 1997) (encouraging trial courts "to heed the direction that we have 
already given them to grant for-cause challenges when bias is shown") (citation omitted); 
State v. Woollev, 810 P.2d 440,442 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (recognizing "'it is a simple 
matter to obviate any problem of bias simply by excusing the prospective juror and 
selecting another'") (citation omitted), cert, denied, 826 P.2d 651 (Utah 1991). 
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Finally, since Ms. English's background in law enforcement raised initial concerns 
about her as a juror, the trial court considered it necessary to follow up with additional 
questions. (See R. 970:28); State v. Calliham. 2002 UT 86, ^ | 49, 55 P.3d 573 (requiring 
trial court to further question potential jurors when disclosures raise concerns). The State 
suggests in its brief that this Court may not consider follow-up voir dire on appeal. (See 
Br. of Appellee, 25 (claiming Tiedemann is barred from raising claims about follow-up 
voir dire)). But the State is mistaken. This Court may consider Ms. English's initial and 
follow-up disclosures because they are part and parcel of Tiedemann's overall objection. 
(See R. 970:32-33). In addition, as a matter of law, this Court will "'look to the entire 
voir dire exchange with the challenged juror,'" Calliham, 2002 UT 86, \ 47 (citation 
omitted), to assess whether the trial court should have stricken her for cause. 
Based on that assessment, Ms. English expressed in follow-up questions that she 
thought she would be able to evaluate evidence more clearly due to her background in 
law enforcement. (See R. 970:28-29). That is, she gave more credence to an officer's 
ability to evaluate information. Since the State's case relied on testimony from officers 
(see R. 969:96 (Troy Johnson); 969:126-27 (Ken Yurgelon); 969:140 (Brad Hunter); 969: 
143.44 (Steven Stinson); 969:174 (Kim Rees); 971:60 (Ron Edwards)), Ms. English's 
statements did not rebut the inference of bias or mitigate the risks to Tiedemann5 s due 
process rights. (See Br. of Appellant, 20). The trial court should have removed Ms. 
English from the panel for case. (See id., Arg. I.) It failed to do so. (R. 970:34). 
For the reasons more fully set forth in the opening brief, Tiedemann asks this 
Court to reverse the convictions and remand the case for further proceedings. 
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II. WITH RESPECT TO THE PKE-MIRANDA STATEMENTS, THE 
STATE SEEMS TO DISREGARD THE PREJUDICE ANALYSIS AND 
INSTEAD RELIES ON A GENERAL SUFFICIENCY ANALYSIS. YET 
SUFFICIENCY IS NOT THE ISSUE ON APPEAL. 
Next, Tiedemann maintains the trial court erred when it denied in part a motion to 
suppress statements he made in connection with a pro-Miranda interrogation. (Br. of 
Appellant, Arg. II.) Specifically, officers engaged in questioning designed to elicit 
incriminating statements without first giving Tiedemann the opportunity to invoke or 
waive his rights per Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). (See Br. of Appellant, 
Arg. II. A.) Officers expressly interrogated Tiedemann at the scene of the arrest while 
Tiedemann was in police custody, handcuffed and held at gunpoint. (Id.) The officers 
knew or should have known that the questions would elicit incriminating statements. 
Consequently, Tiedemann's statements were coerced and should have been suppressed. 
(Id.) The trial court suppressed the statements in part. (R. 966:30). However, as the 
State acknowledges, the trial court allowed the State to present certain pre-Miranda 
statements in evidence. (See supra, page 2, herein; Br. of Appellee, 26 (citing R. 
969:138; 969:148)). That was error. (Br. of Appellant, Arg. II.) 
The State disagrees. It has focused on the prejudice analysis. (Br. of Appellee, 
Argument IL); see also State v. DemberU 2009 UT App 153, Case No. 20070068, 2009 
WL 1636031 (Utah Ct. App. June 11, 2009) (unpublished) (focusing on prejudice). It 
claims that any trial court error in admitting the prs-Miranda statements in evidence was 
harmless. (Br. of Appellee, 28-29). Also, the State appears to rely on a cursory 
sufficiency analysis for that claim. (See, e.g., icL, 29 (generally identifying evidence)). 
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Yet the prejudice analysis is not the sufficiency standard in disguise. "Rather, the 
reviewing court is to decide whether, considering all the evidence, there was a reasonable 
likelihood that the jury would have decided the case differently." State v. MitchelL 779 
P.2d 1116, 1122 (Utah 1989). The court "focuses on the taint caused by the error. If the 
taint is sufficient, it is irrelevant that there is sufficient untainted evidence to support a 
verdict." Id, Also, "[i]n analyzing errors, we are guided by the fundamental principle 
that all the rules relating to the conduct of criminal trials are meant to provide a fair, 
reasonable and practical means of doing justice." State v. Lenaburg* 781 P.2d 432, 436-
37 (Utah 1989), abrogated in part on other grounds as stated in State v. Doporto, 935 
P.2d 484 (Utah 1997). If the error casts doubt on the result, "reversal is warranted." I<L 
In this case, as set forth in the opening brief, the State presented conflicting 
evidence and the jury was required to assess credibility. (See Br. of Appellant, 36-37). 
Also, Deborah Pryor's credibility was tarnished. (Id.) In that instance, evidence of 
Tiedemann's confession would have a prejudicial and "'profound impact on the jury, so 
much so that we may justifiably doubt [the jury's] ability to put [it] out of mind even if 
told to do so.'" Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 296 (1991) (citation omitted). 
Tiedemann has presented prejudice based on the record here. (Br. of Appellant, 
Argument II.B.) 
CONCLUSION 
Edgar Tiedemann respectfully asks this Court to reverse the trial court's ruling as 
it relates to a for-cause challenge, and to evidence of iprt-Miranda confessions. Also, 
Tiedemann requests that this Court remand this case for a new trial. 
13 
SUBMITTED this ^ day of June, 2009. 
Linda M. Jones 
Heidi Anne BucKi 
Patrick Coram 
Heather Breretoti 
Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc. 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, Linda M. Jones, hereby certify that I have caused to be hand-delivered an original and 
7 copies of the foregoing to the Utah Court of Appeals, 450 South State Street, 5th Floor, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114; and 4 copies to the Attorney General's Office, Heber M. 
Wells Building, 160 East 300 South, 6th Floor, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this ^ 
day of June, 2009. 
DELIVERED to the Utah Attorney General's Office and the Utah Court of 
Appeals as indicated above this day of , 2009. 
14 
